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Broad, reciprocal pretrial discovery in criminal cases is an impor-
tant development which will promote early and just resolutions of
cases that need not go to trial, and will make those cases that do go
to trial more dependent upon their facts than upon techniques such
as concealment and surprise. In the area of the jury, 12 is no longer
a sacred number, and the size of juries in the future will depend
upon the desires of the various legislatures. But the greatest
significance of Williams is that the Court has given the states free-
dom to serve as laboratories to test new approaches to criminal
justice, with the hope that they will discover more progressive pro-
cedures to administer justice in a speedy but fair manner."
LABOR RELATIONS - COLLECTIVE BARGAINING -
GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
Federal labor law requires parties negotiating a collective bar-
gaining agreement to confer in "good faith."' Many problems sur-
round this simply stated requirement, and generally they fall into
two principal areas. First, there is the difficult task of establishing
what actions constitute a breach of the good faith duty. Second,
there is the problem of what the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) can do to remedy a violation. The experience of the 35
years since the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) has generated some rules which purport to identify what
constitutes a violation of the good faith standard,2 but the applica-
tion of these rules to particular fact situations is fraught with dif-
ficulty. A greater problem, however, is the fashioning of effective
remedies.
H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB3 illustrates the problems the Board
faces in the area of remedies. During the initial stages of negotiat-
ing a collective bargaining agreement with the United Steelworkers,
the Porter company had refused to agree to check off dues for the
union, a practice followed by 95 percent of all manufacturing in-
dustries.4 In testimony before the trial examiner, the company ad-
mitted that its objection to checking off union dues was not due to
80 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
inconvenience or economic considerations; it was simply "not going
to aid and comfort the union."5 The Board found that Porter was
not bargaining in good faith and ordered the company to cease and
desist from its unfair labor practices and to comply with the require-
ments of the NLRA.8  When the company failed to comply with
this order, the Board ordered Porter to grant a contract clause to
the union providing for the check off of dues.t The court of ap-
peals affirmed the order on the grounds that the imposition of a
check-off clause is, at most, a minor intrusion on the freedom of con-
tract policy of the NLRA, and that the history of the company's
violations called for just such a remedy.8 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the Board lacks the power to compel an em-
ployer or a union to agree to a substantive provision in a collective
bargaining agreement.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, looked at the leg-
islative history of the NLRA. He found that the drafters never in-
1 Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964),
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
his employees' representatives. Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964),
added in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act, defines to bargain collectively,
in part, as conferring in good faith with respect to certain terms and conditions of em-
ployment. For a commentary on the good faith requirement, see Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1412-18 (1958). See also Duvin, The
Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 248 (1964); Fanning,
The Duty to Bargain in 1962, 14 LAB. .J. 18 (1963); Feinsinger, The National Labor
Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MicH. L. REV. 807 (1959); Fleming, New
Challenges for Collective Bargaining, 1964 WIs. L. REv. 426.
2 See NIRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953) (refusal to meet with duly elected employee representative);
NLRB v. Ozark Dam Constructors, 190 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1951) (offering a contract
on a "take it or leave ie' basis); NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1948)
(attaching conditions to entering negotiations). See also Cox, supra note 1, at 1403-06;
McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,
19 LAB. L.J. 131 (1968).
3 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
4 2 BNA COLLECrnvE BARGAiING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 87:3 (1970).
Under a check-off clause, a company agrees to periodically deduct dues from the em-
ployees' wages and to pay that money directly to the union.
5 397 U.S. at 101.
6H.K. Porter Co., Disston Div.-Danville Works, 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), en-
forced, United Steelworkers v. NIRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
851 (1966).
7 H.K. Porter Co., Disston Div.-Danville Works, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 1968-2
CCH NLRB Dec. 25,114, aJJfd, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 99
(1970). On a motion by the union asking it to clarify its 1966 opinion, the court of
appeals had held that in certain circumstances, such as the employer's continued re-
fusal to bargain in good faith, a check-off provision could be imposed as a remedy.
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295,298 (D.C. Cir. 1967).8 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 99
(1970).
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tended that the duty to bargain collectively would require any em-
ployer to reach an agreement. The Court had acknowledged this
policy in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,10 where it said:
"The Act does not compel agreements between employers and em-
ployees. It does not compel any agreement whatever."" In 1947
Congress added section 8(d) to the NLRA which provided that the
obligation to bargain in good faith "does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."'"
Mr. Justice Black agreed with the court of appeals that literally sec-
tion 8 (d) refers only to determining whether a violation of the duty
to bargain collectively has occurred. But he considered it anomalous
to contend that, while section 8(d) prohibits the use of a refusal
to agree as proof of bad faith bargaining, the NLRA permits the
Board to compel agreement. Thus, the Court found that the
Board had exceeded its authority in requiring the Porter Company to
check off dues.
The Court left the Board with only its conventional remedy of
issuing a cease and desist order 3 and having it enforced by the
courts if the employer fails to comply.' 4 Mr. Justice Black recog-
nized that the present remedial powers of the Board are too narrow
to cope with important labor problems, notably in the area of good
faith bargaining, but he concluded that it is the job of Congress,
and not the Board or the courts, to decide "when and if it is neces-
sary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective bar-
gaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side's de-
mands."' 15 Thus, although the Board is charged with the duty to
order parties to act affirmatively to effectuate the policies of the
NLRA, 1 it is restricted to those actions that will not upset the time-
honored principle of freedom of contract.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented.
He felt that, because of the repeated obstinacy of the company,
there was no alternative but to grant the Board the authority to
9 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935); 79 CONG. R.Ec. 7659
(1935) (statement of Senator Walsh). See als Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to
Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1941).
10 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
11 Id. at 45.
12 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hardey Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964),
amending NLRA, ch. 372, § 8,49 Stat. 449 (1935).
13 NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
14Id. § 160(e).
'5 397 U.S. at 109.
16 NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
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impose the check off as "affirmative action" necessary to remedy'
the company's flagrant refusals to bargain in good faith. Justice
Douglas was quite aware that such a ruling might later be inter-
preted too broadly and "gain a momentum not warranted by the
exigencies of its creation."' 7  But he still felt that where there are
repeated abuses, as in Porter, the Board has the power to compel
submission to one-sided proposals. In the future, should an employ-
er's refusal to *reach agreement be founded on any business consid-
eration, rather than arbitrary avoidance of an agreement with the
union, the remedy would not be available. Mr. Justice Douglas' em-
phasis on the narrow factual situation in Porter indicates that he too
feels that the Board is normally limited in its discretion by the prin-
ciple of noninterference with the substance of the collective bar-
gaining process.
A study of the duty to bargain cases made by Professor Phillip
Ross of the University of Buffalo concluded that the major short-
coming of the NLRB lies in its failure to adopt adequate and realistic
remedies in those cases where the employer has unmistakably demon-
strated a continuing intent to violate the NLRA.18 The Court's
decision in Porter has frustrated the Board's attempt to fashion a
new and effective remedy. This is unfortunate because the conven-
tional Board remedy does not realistically recognize the conse-
quences of a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.
Presently it may take a year before the Board makes a finding
of bad faith bargaining,'" and perhaps another year before the courts
enforce a cease and desist order,20 which may be little more than ex-
hortatory anyway. 1 A remedy granted more than 2 years after the
event will bear little relation to the human situation which gave
rise to the need for governmental intervention. 2 During the time
17 397 U.S. at 110.
18 Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley, 63 LAB. REL. REP.
132, 133 (1966).
19 Under section 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964), the Board, after
issuing a complaint, can obtain a temporary injunction against the unfair labor prac-
tice. Attempts to secure such relief, however, have not been viewed favorably by the
courts, essentially because of the judicial unwillingness to interfere with the bargaining
process. See, e.g., Meter v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 273 F. Supp. 659 (D. Minn.),
rev'd, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967) (injunction denied when the Board sought to
compel employers to negotiate with a recognized union).
20 Under section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), the Board can ask for
temporary injunctive relief when it petitions a court of appeals for enforcement.
21 See McCulloch, supra note 2.
22 See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH CONG., 1sT SEss.,
REPORT ON THE NLRB 16-26 (Comm. Print 1961).
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between the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a Board order,
employees are deprived of the benefits of collective representation,
and the power of their chosen representatives wanes. Employee
turnover and changing conditions further weaken the union which
cannot bring back a satisfactory contract. As the court of appeals
recognized during the Porter litigation, when the unfair practices
are committed in localities where hostility to unions runs deep, the
determined employer who litigates often succeeds in ousting the
union despite the Board's finding of NLRA violations.2 3
The recent decision by the NLRB in the Ex-Cello Corp.24 case
illustrates the impact of Porter. In 1967, the trial examiner found
that Ex-Cello had unlawfully refused to bargain in good faith. He
recommended as a remedy, in addition to the standard bargaining
order, that Ex-Cello be required to compensate its employees for
the wages and benefits they would have received through collective
bargaining if Ex-Cello had bargained in good faith. Although rec-
ognizing that a mere affirmative order to bargain upon request does
not eradicate the effects of an illegal delay of over 2 years, the
Board reluctantly concluded that, because of Porter, it could not
approve the trial examiner's recommendation.
Although the Porter remedy was a prospective one, which would
have bound the employer to a specific contract provision, and the
Ex-Cello remedy would have acted retroactively to impose financial
liability upon an employer based upon a presumed contract, the
Board did not think the cases were distinguishable. It felt that the
presumption of an agreement in the latter situation would be tanta-
mount to the imposition of an agreement, and thus was prohibited by
Porter.
The Ex-Cello decision demonstrates the constraining effect that
Porter will have on the Board. The Board is adhering to Mr. Justice
Black's conclusion that the bold changes in the law which are neces-
sary must be advanced by the legislature, not by the Board or the
courts.25  *Whether Congress will provide the necessary legislation
23 United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
2 4 Ex-Cello Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1970 CCH NLRB
Dec.) 5 22,251 (Aug. 25, 1970). For analyses of this case while it was pending before
the Board and of both the scope and nature of the Board's remedial powers, see Mc-
Guiness, Is the Award of Damages for Refusals to Bargain Consistent with National
Labor Policy?, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1086 (1968); Comment, Employee Reimbursement
for an Employer's Refusal to Bargain: The Ex-Cell-O Doctrine, 46 TEXAS L REV.
758 (1968).
25 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1970 CCH NLRB Dec.) at 28,672-73.
